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MODUS DARWIN RECONSIDERED
CASEY HELGESON
Abstract. Modus Darwin is the name given by Elliott Sober to a form of
argument that Sober attributes to Darwin in the Origin of Species, and to sub-
sequent evolutionary biologists who have reasoned in the same way. In short,
the argument form goes: Similarity, ergo common ancestry. In the present pa-
per I review and critique Sober’s analysis of Darwin’s reasoning. I argue that
modus Darwin has serious limitations that make the argument form unsuited for
supporting Darwin’s conclusions, and that Darwin did not reason in this way.
Casey Helgeson
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
Lakatos Building
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
C.Helgeson@lse.ac.uk
1. Introduction
One of the central tenants of modern evolutionary biology is the shared ancestry
of all extant life on Earth. Darwin’s On the Origin of Species took a big step in
that direction. Darwin could address only the portion of Earth’s biota of which
nineteenth-century naturalists were aware, and he could see only a short ways back
into the long history of life. But he argued compellingly that diverse groups of
organisms had evolved each from a single ancestor species, concluding that “ani-
mals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from
an equal or lesser number” (Darwin; 1859/2003, 484). It was a radical conclusion,
yet his scientific audience was largely convinced (Bowler; 1989; Larson; 2004).1
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1The broad acceptance of common ancestry by Darwin’s scientific audience – within a decade or
two of the Origin – should not be confused with their lukewarm response to natural selection,
which languished until the modern synthesis.
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In a series of publications, Elliott Sober has sought to clarify and analyze Dar-
win’s case for common ancestry, and to generalize Darwin’s reasoning to encompass
contemporary thinking about newer evidence for the hypothesis (Sober; 1999, 2008,
2011; Sober and Steel; 2002, 2014). Sober’s project is thus part exegesis, part epis-
temology: How does Darwin argue?, and How does that argument justify common
ancestry? In answer to the first question, Sober attributes to Darwin the following
argument form:
Similarity, ergo common ancestry. This form of argument occurs so often
in Darwin’s writings that it deserves to be called modus Darwin. The
finches in the Galapagos Islands are similar; hence, they descended from
a common ancestor. Human beings and monkeys are similar; hence, they
descended from a common ancestor. The examples are plentiful, not just
in Darwin’s thought, but in evolutionary reasoning down to the present.
(Sober; 1999, 265)
To address the epistemological question, Sober sets out to formalize modus Darwin
with mathematical rigor, ultimately deriving the force of the argument form from
the Law of Likelihood (explained below).
In this essay I review and critique Sober’s analysis of Darwin’s reasoning. After
introducing Sober’s account, I temporarily bracket Darwin exegesis to focus on
the epistemic merits of modus Darwin as Sober understands it. Here I argue that
several difficulties undermine Sober’s defense of that argument form. Then I turn
back to Darwin and argue against attributing to him the suspect argument form
similarity, ergo common ancestry. I suggest an alternative reading of key Origin
passages, and offer a partial epistemological defense of the reasoning that I see
therein.
2. Modus Darwin
Sober derives the normative force of modus Darwin from the Law of Likelihood
(Hacking; 1965; Royall; 1997; Sober; 2008), according to which an observation
supports one hypothesis over another whenever that observation is more proba-
ble supposing the one hypothesis were true, compared with supposing the other
hypothesis were true. More formally, observation o favors hypothesis h1 over hy-
pothesis h2 if and only if p(o|h1) > p(o|h2). Mapping this framework onto Darwin’s
reasoning requires identifying an observation o, and two hypotheses h1 and h2.
Similarity between two species is the observation o. The hypothesis h1 is com-
mon ancestry (CA), which says that those two species descended from a single
ancestor species. For the alternative hypothesis h2, Sober chooses separate ances-
try (SA), meaning that the two species’ lineages trace back to separate origin-of-life
events. These are, however, only the rough, qualitative statements of o, h1, and h2.
To evaluate the inequality p(o|h1) > p(o|h2), Sober must define o more concretely
and then formally characterize h1 and h2 as stochastic (chancy) processes that can
produce such outcomes with some concrete probability.
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Regarding the observation o, when do two species count as “similar”? Any
two species are similar in some ways and dissimilar in others. What is the right
yardstick? Sober initially sidesteps this thorny question, and begins with a simpler
and more tractable observation: that two species share the same trait on a single
dichotomous character. A dichotomous character is one that has just two possible
states, for example an insect might have wings or lack them, or the edge of a
leaf might be smooth or serrated. (Coding morphology in terms of dichotomous
characters typically masks more continuous underlying variation, but dichotomous
characters are adequate in many scientific contexts, and they provide a convenient
starting point for the formalization of modus Darwin.)
Does the observation favor CA over SA sensu the Law of Likelihood? To gen-
erate the required conditional probabilities Sober repurposes the idealizations and
mathematical framework of contemporary phylogenetic inference, as follows. Let
variables X and Y represent the two species, where each can take states {0, 1},
standing for the two possible states of the dichotomous character. So the observa-
tion o is both species in the same state (either both 0 or both 1). Each hypothesis
is then characterized by a schematic genealogy for the two species (Figure 1), plus
a stochastic model describing how the character variables change states as they
move along a line in the genealogy. (While Darwin’s primary target in Origin was
a non-evolutionary, creationist version of the separate ancestry hypothesis, Sober
prefers to reconstruct modus Darwin using a separate ancestry hypothesis that
allows for evolutionary change. The idea is that this choice leaves the basic form
of Darwin’s reasoning intact, with the added benefit of illuminating the fundamen-
tal similarity between Darwin’s reasoning and subsequent arguments made within
evolutionary theory.)
SA
CA
X
Y
X
Y
Figure 1. Schematic diagrams illustrating lineages postulated by
the common ancestry (CA) and separate ancestry (SA) hypotheses.
The model of character-state evolution (applied in the same way to all solid lines
in both Figure 1 schematics) works as follows. Each solid line comprises a number
of time steps (the same number for each of the four lines); the variable associated
with each line starts in one state or the other, and then undergoes this many time
steps of evolution. At every step there is a small probability that the variable
changes from its present state to the other state. (Two state-change probabilities
are required: 0 → 1 and 1 → 0, which need not be equal.) The probability of
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changing states at any given step depends only on the current state of the variable.
The longer the stretch of lineage, the greater the chance that the character variable
will change along that stretch.
In which state does a character variable begin? The initial state of is determined
by a random draw from a probability distribution over the state space {0, 1} (i.e.,
a coin flip—though the coin may be biased). And here lies the only difference
between the stochastic models of CA and SA: for SA the initial states of X and Y
are set by two independent draws from that distribution, whereas for CA just one
draw is required because X and Y must begin in the same state (think of this as
the point just before speciation).
With CA and SA so characterized, Sober proves the following result: for X and
Y to end up in the same state at the end of the process is more probable on CA
than on SA regardless of time steps, state-change probabilities, and starting-state
distribution (Sober; 2008, chap. 4).2 In other words, two species found in the same
state always favors CA over SA. It isn’t hard to understand intuitively why this is
so. If the state-change probabilities are small relative to the number of time steps,
then the most probable outcome along any branch is stasis. In this case, since CA
puts the two species in the same state from the start, chances are good they will
both still be in that state at the end. The chances of ending in the same state are
somewhat smaller on SA, since X and Y may or may not begin in the same state.
As the probability of state change along a branch increases (due either to long
lineages or high state-change probabilities), p(o|CA) and p(o|SA) converge on the
same value, though p(o|CA) must always be a little bit higher. The opposite is
true for species found in different states: mismatches always favor SA over CA.
Sober goes on to extend this treatment to cover multistate characters as well,
where the variables X and Y can now take any number of states {1, 2, . . . n} and
correspondingly more state-change probabilities are needed: one for every possible
transition from one state to another (i → j, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}). Sober
shows that, here too, X and Y in the same state at the end of the process is more
probable on CA than on SA. Mismatches on multistate characters, however, are
more complicated. Some mismatches will favor CA, while others will favor SA,
depending on the details (Sober; 2008, 295–314).
Finally, Sober returns to the question of overall similarity by considering a set
of observations {o1, o2, . . . om}, each concerning a different trait. Given such a
set, including both matches and mismatches, which hypothesis is favored overall?
As described above, the evidential import of of each individual observation oi is
encoded by the ratio of conditional probabilities p(oi|CA)/p(oi|SA). Supposing
that the process by which each trait evolves is probabilistically independent of
2With these very minor assumptions: the starting-state distribution gives non-zero probabilities
to both states; transition probabilities are strictly between 0 and 1; and time steps are finite.
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that governing every other trait,3 the set of observations favors CA over SA if and
only if the product of those ratios (one from each observed trait) is greater than
one—in mathematical notation, if and only if:
(1)
m∏
i=1
p(oi|CA)
p(oi|SA) > 1.
The idea is that for similar species (e.g., humans and chimpanzees, or two types
of finch) the calculation will come out in favor of CA.4
Application to biogeography. To interpret Darwin’s geographical distribution
observations (how species are distributed about the globe), Sober develops a vari-
ant of modus Darwin that proceeds from observed geographical proximity rather
than anatomical similarity, in other words: proximity, ergo common ancestry. All
that’s required is a reinterpretation of the stochastic model of character-state evo-
lution as a model of geographical dispersal.
Consider a multistate character with ten discrete states. The model governing
how this character evolves requires a ten-by-ten matrix of transition probabilities,
one for each possible transition from one state to another (Equation 2). Allow non-
zero probability only between neighboring states (and between a state and itself).
Now think of the states themselves as geographical locations along a line (e.g.,
islands in an archipelago) rather than variants of an anatomical character. And
think of state change as geographical dispersal rather than morphological evolution.
A species can disperse from one location to another only by passing through the
locations in-between, thus the zeros for non-neighboring state transitions. “Neutral
evolution within an ordered n-state character is formally just like random dispersal
across an n-island archipelago.” (Sober; 2008, 326)
(2)

.99 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.01 .98 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 .01 .98 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .01 .99

3While this assumption is certainly not true, it is a standard idealization in, e.g., phylogenetic
inference from genetic data (thinking of each nucleotide site, or of each codon, as a trait).
4Not that anyone explicitly carried out such a calculation. But evaluating historical reasoning
through the lens of modern epistemic norms always involves out-of-context formalities. If one
aims, in addition, to illuminate the way that an author or their audience actually reasoned, the
fact that no actor drew pen and paper to calculate is not necessarily an obstacle: the success of a
simple reasoning heuristic might require some math to explain, and the cognitive underpinnings
of ostensibly qualitative reasoning can approximate complex calculations (as per the wide-spread
use of Bayesian statistics in the descriptive modeling of human and animal reasoning, see, e.g.,
Kemp and Tenenbaum’s (2008) descriptive model of pre-Darwinian taxonomic reasoning).
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A random draw from a distribution over the ten states determines where a
species begins.5 And just as with anatomical modus Darwin, the difference be-
tween CA and SA is that CA posits one random draw (whence both species begin
dispersing) while SA posits two independent draws, one for each species. The ob-
servation o is then the observed spatial separation between species (|X −Y|) after
a period of dispersal. In this example, Sober calculates that:
With ten locations, the expectation under the separate-ancestry hypoth-
esis is that X and Y will be a bit more than three islands away from each
other. If X and Y are more spatially proximate than this, then CA has
the higher likelihood; if not, not. (Sober; 2008, 326)
Sober goes on analyze Darwin’s use of geographical distribution observations in the
Origin by mapping the reinterpreted formalism onto Darwin’s (chap. 12) discussion
of the Galapagos Archipelago. I will return to the Galapagos example later on.
3. Limitations of Sober’s Formal Framework
Set Darwin to one side for the moment and consider the argument form modus
Darwin on its own merits. Is Sober’s formal, probabilistic argument cogent? And
what does it tell us about the argument form similarity, ergo common ancestry?
These are the question I address here. I will argue that two features of Sober’s
formal framework sharply limit the validation that it provides for modus Darwin.
The core mathematical result underlying Sober’s analysis is that two species
found in the same state for a single character always favors CA over SA. While
this conclusion is striking in its generality, it does not by itself get one very far
towards applying modus Darwin to real observations. Most applications call for a
continuous, or at least multi-state, treatment, where exact matches will be few and
far between. And as soon as we leave behind the special case of the exact match,
all of the details and parameters that Sober’s proof manages to bracket become
important again. Here modus Darwin can pronounce evidential favoring verdicts
only after additional assumptions fix the moving parts within the stochastic models
of CA and SA. Can the right assumptions be identified in the contexts in which
the inference form is supposed to operate? There is reason for worry in the cases
of branch lengths, and the size of the anatomical space.
Anatomical space. Suppose we compare species X and Y on a given anatom-
ical character, and we model this character as having 10 ordered states (Sober’s
example, from above). Say it’s the length of a certain bone in centimeters, and
the species measure 1cm and 4cm, for a difference of 3. Sticking with the Equa-
tion 2 transition probabilities (and the resulting equilibrium distribution for the
5The state-change probabilities (Equation 2) determine what is called the equilibrium distribution
of the location variable, which gives the probabilities of finding the variable in each of its ten
states after (loosely speaking) infinitely many time steps. Sober uses this equilibrium distribution
as the starting-state distribution; in this case that distribution is uniform.
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initial states) and supposing a middling 300 time steps, the observation gives a
likelihood ratio a hair above 1 (i.e., no evidence either way). But now rethink one
of the modeling decisions that led to this number. Who said the range of possible
character states is 1–10? Perhaps the upper limit is instead 5, or 15. Figure 2
displays likelihood ratios for the same observation—and others—recalculated on
the assumption that the range of possible states is 1–5 (light gray) and 1–15 (dark
gray). Using the 1–5 space, our 3cm observation registers as evidence favoring
SA, but using the 1–15 space, the observation favors CA. Looking across possible
observations, on the 1–5 space the evidence turns against CA when the difference
between states passes 1; in the case of 1–15 the same happens only above 4.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
fifteen states
five states
difference between states
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
ra
tio
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
Figure 2. Likelihood ratios p(obs.|CA)/p(obs.|SA) for character
state observations, varying the assumed range of possible states.
Ratios above one favor CA, ratios below one favor SA.
In general, positing a larger anatomical space raises the likelihood ratio, making
the evidence appear more favorable to CA, while positing a smaller space lowers
the ratio, pushing the needle back towards SA. This effect happens through the
denominator, p(obs.|SA). (If the starting states of X and Y are chosen indepen-
dently from a uniform distribution, then a bigger space makes larger observed
differences more probable.) The size of the space matters little to the numerator,
p(obs.|CA): if variables that begin in the same state will have typically evolved
apart by 3 units at the end of the process, it makes no difference to the outcome
whether the space in which this occurs is 15 units wide or 150.
The problem is that the choice between different state spaces appears to be ar-
bitrary. What could privilege one over another? You might think to use the range
of states observed across all taxa, but surely the organisms that have evolved so
far don’t exhaust all possible anatomies. If there is no sensible way of fixing the
allowable character states, then Sober’s formal framework does not, in the end,
yield any evidence rulings. In other words, that framework fails to demonstrate
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how the Law of Likelihood can be brought to bear on the matter of common an-
cestry versus separate ancestry, in which case the framework does little to validate
the argument form modus Darwin.
Branch lengths. Continuing with the example of the ordered, 10-state character
(now bracketing concerns about how to choose the range of possible states), Sober
writes that the expectation under SA is that species X and Y will be observed to
differ by just over three states, and that observations below this threshold favor
CA over SA. But this analysis understates the dependence of the evidential favor-
ing verdict on the stipulations that go into the model’s evolutionary mechanics:
while the expectation claim is correct, it does not follow, and it is not generally
true, that distances below that expectation favor CA. For trait differences of 1–3,
the direction of evidential favoring depends on branch length, a term from phylo-
genetics that refers to the probability of change along a lineage. Branch length is
a function of both the number of time steps (in the solid lines of Figure 1) and
the transition probabilities (e.g., Equation 2): one branch is longer than another
if change is more probable along that branch, whether this is due to more time
steps, or to higher transition probabilities, or a combination of the two.
To understand intuitively the dependence of evidential favoring on branch length,
consider the case of branch lengths so short that any change at all is very improb-
able. Since CA puts the species in the same state to begin with, they will very
probably still be in the same state after the period of evolution, for a trait differ-
ence of 0. In this case, observing a difference of 1, 2, or 3 will heavily favor separate
ancestry. The broader picture of dependence on branch length can be seen in Fig-
ure 3, which displays likelihood ratios for all observations 0–9, calculated on three
different assumptions about the number of time steps of evolution. The shorter the
time frame, the closer the two states must be for the observation to favor CA. And
since the mathematics is the same for geographical dispersal, the lesson applies
equally to biogeographical modus Darwin. (Equation 2 transition probabilities are
used throughout; alternatively, one could explore dependence on branch length
by fixing the number of time steps and scaling the transition probabilities—with
equivalent results.)
So using Sober’s likelihood framework to interpret similarity/proximity as evi-
dence bearing on common ancestry requires knowledge of branch lengths. What
does this mean for modus Darwin? One thing the formal framework is meant to
do is show that similarity can indeed be evidence for common ancestry. Depen-
dence on branch length does not stand in the way—it means only that the range of
circumstances under which similarity does count as evidence for common ancestry
is defined by, among other things, details about branch length.
But we might hope to go beyond saying that similarity can sometimes be ev-
idence for common ancestry to argue that agents in a particular context were
justified in taking the similarities that they observed as evidence for common an-
cestry. For example, that in deploying modus Darwin, Darwin himself made a
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Figure 3. Likelihood ratios p(obs.|CA)/p(obs.|SA) for observed
character state differences, varying the number of time steps. Ratios
above 1 favor CA and ratios below 1 favor SA.
good argument. Or that readers swayed by that argument were convinced ratio-
nally. Sober’s likelihood framework is relevant here as well. No one is claiming
that Darwin explicitly calculated any likelihood ratios, but Sober’s rigorous prob-
abilistic framework articulates a line of reasoning that can also be appreciated
qualitatively. Which hypothesis fits better with observed anatomical similarities:
That two species started out identical, then evolved some? Or that they started
with randomly chosen anatomies, then evolved some? This qualitative version of
Sober’s likelihood reasoning displays the same dependence on branch length: one
cannot judge without knowing something about how long the species have been
evolving, and how quickly species evolve. Could a mid-nineteenth century natu-
ralist have had sufficient grasp of the pace and timescale of evolution to justifiably
argue that common ancestry is the better fit with the observed similarities?
Insight into the timescale of biological change came from geology via paleontol-
ogy. Tremendous progress was made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in collating layers of sediment from sites around the world, resulting in a coherent
time-ordering of geological eras and of the fossil remains carried within those lay-
ers. But the project of assigning absolute dates to geological eras (and thus fossil
remains) proceeded much more slowly. The nineteenth century was characterized
by competing and wildly divergent estimates of the age of the earth and its geolog-
ical eras (Gohau; 1990), and by interdisciplinary jostling on the subject between
biologists, geologists, and physicists (Shipley; 2001).
Early nineteenth century catastrophists thought in terms of hundreds of thou-
sands of years (Cuvier), or of millions (de Serres, Buckland). Lyell’s uniformitarian
assumptions led him to posit 240 million years since the beginning of the Cambrian
period—which contained the earliest known fossils at that time (Gohau; 1990). But
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physicists balked at the idea of a steady-state earth, and following mid-century de-
velopments in thermodynamics William Thompson (later Lord Kelvin) calculated
at most one half—and more probably one tenth—of that time for the earth’s entire
history from a molten state to its present condition (Burchfield; 1975). Thomp-
son’s work was influential, pushing most geologists in the late nineteenth century
away from uniformitarianism and towards shorter time scales and faster geological
processes (Bowler; 1989, chap. 7).
Darwin followed Lyell in matters geological, and his own back-of-the-envelope
calculations were even more generous than Lyell’s Cambrian estimate.6 Darwin
had originally assumed an almost unlimited amount of time for life to evolve
(Bowler; 1989; Larson; 2004), and the trend towards shorter time scales put pres-
sure on his theory of natural selection. In particular, Thompson’s timeframe was
regarded by all parties as too short for Darwin’s slow, gradual process to yield
the observed diversity of life. The discrepancy contributed to skepticism about
natural selection and encouraged evolutionists’ explorations of alternative pro-
cesses, including orthogenesis, saltationism, and Lamarckian inheritance. Though
skeptical of Thompson’s results, Darwin himself gave the inheritance of acquired
characteristics an ever greater role in later editions of the Origin, in part to allow
for more rapid evolution (Larson; 2004, chap. 5).
Yet through all of the uncertainty and discord over the timescale, pace and
processes of evolution, naturalists grew ever more committed to common ancestry
and evolution by some mechanism or other—also called the “theory of descent.”
Writing in 1907, American entomologist Vernon Kellogg summarized the state
of play in his Darwinism to-day (“Darwinism” referring specifically to Darwin’s
theory of natural selection):
While many reputable biologists to-day strongly doubt the commonly
reputed effectiveness of the Darwinian selection factors to explain descent
– some, indeed, holding them to be of absolutely no species-forming
value – practically no naturalists of position and recognized attainment
doubt the theory of descent. Organic evolution, that is, the descent of
species, is looked on by biologists to be as proved a part of their science
as gravitation is in the science of physics or chemical affinity in that
of chemistry. Doubts of Darwinism are not, then, doubts of organic
evolution. (Kellogg; 1907, 3)
So the broad historical narrative shows increasing conviction on common an-
cestry driving research into the mechanisms of evolution and inheritance, while
6Darwin gives an example close to home: a large geological feature in south-eastern England
called the Weald, where relatively deep geological strata are exposed. Higher layers of known
(local) thickness must have been worn away over time, and based on what Darwin considers a
conservative estimate of the rate of denudation (wearing down, by various means) he estimates
that the process must have required 300 million years (Darwin; 1859/2003, 285–7). All of the
strata in question are well above the Cambrian layer—so compared to Lyell’s Cambrian estimate,
Darwin’s 300 million is a bigger number for a period known to be significantly shorter.
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fuzzy ideas about the pace and timescale of evolution were pushed around by
constraints from geology and physics.7 Consider again the essence of Sober’s like-
lihood reasoning: In any given case, are the observed similarities more like what
would result from two species starting out identical, then evolving a while (CA), or
starting with randomly chosen anatomies and then evolving a while (SA)? Given
their ignorance about branch lengths, could Victorian naturalists have sensibly
approached this question, in even a qualitative and tentative way? The broad-
brush history rehearsed above suggests not, in which case we cannot view Sober’s
likelihood reasoning as providing a rationale by which Darwin or his readers could
have justifiably interpreted similarity as evidence for common ancestry.
To summarize, dependence on branch length does not undermine Sober’s demon-
stration that similarity can sometimes be evidence for common ancestry. But it
does mean that without knowledge of branch lengths, one cannot know when this
“sometimes” obtains. Sober’s likelihood ratios also depend on how one specifies
the space of possible character states. This poses a deeper challenge since unlike
branch length, the extent of the character space appears to be a fundamentally
arbitrary mathematical stipulation. If there is no correct way of fixing the char-
acter state space, then the framework’s evidence rulings are themselves arbitrary
and fail to show that similarity can sometimes be evidence for common ancestry.
Did Darwin use Modus Darwin?
So far I have raised concerns about the epistemological merits of modus Darwin.
But now that the inference form looks increasingly difficult to justify, we might
step back and (giving Darwin the benefit of the doubt) reconsider the attribution.
While Sober sees modus Darwin at work throughout Darwin’s thinking, two spe-
cific Origin passages receive special attention (Sober; 2008). In what follows, I
examine these two passages and ask whether modus Darwin plays a role in the
reasoning displayed there. In each case, I’ll answer ‘No,’ and briefly sketch an
alternative reading.
Adaptive characters. Are some similarities between species X and Y more
telling than others in favor of common ancestry? Sober raises the question while
discussing the combined evidence from a set of observations (Sober; 2008, 297),
and cites the following passage as Darwin’s answer:
On my view of characters being of real importance for classification,
only in so far as they reveal descent, we can clearly understand why
analogical or adaptive character, although of the utmost importance to
the welfare of the being, are almost valueless to the systematist. For
7To quicky finish the narrative: In the early twentieth century Thompson’s age-of-the-earth
calculations were conclusively undermined by new understanding of radioactivity, and geologists
began to embrace longer time scales. Another few decades’ work in genetics and related fields
would ease other worries about the efficacy of natural selection (Mayr; 1982, 510–525), leading
to the modern synthesis and the resurgence of “Darwinism.”
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animals, belonging to two most distinct lines of descent, may readily
become adapted to similar conditions and thus assume a close external
resemblance; but such resemblances will not reveal—will rather tend to
conceal their blood-relationship to their proper lines of descent. (Darwin;
1859/2003, 427)
Within the formal framework discussed above, Sober shows that transition proba-
bilities that bias both X and Y towards a particular state (i.e., selection) give rise
to smaller likelihood ratios for the observation of both species in the favored state,
compared to symmetrical transition probabilities (drift) (Sober; 2008, 297–8). In
other words, matches on adaptive characters are weaker evidence for CA over SA,
just as Darwin said.
Or did he? The quoted passage comes from a section of chapter 13 labeled
“classification,” in which Darwin reinterprets existing taxonomic practice in light
of his theory of evolution. Mid-nineteenth century taxonomic classifications used a
groups-within-groups structure to represent relationships between taxa. In essence,
Darwin said that those taxonomic structures were in fact genealogical trees (now
we would say phylogenetic trees), and that existing taxonomic practice amounted
to a method of phylogenetic inference. To drive home the point, Darwin picked
out a handful of taxonomic practices that—though widely followed—had no deep
methodological justification, and he argued that those practices made sense in
light of his theory of evolution and interpretation of taxonomy. One of those
poorly-grounded practices was the discounting of adaptive characters.
So Darwin’s comments address the role of adaptive characters in phylogenetic
systematics, where the competing hypotheses are alternative genealogical trees
(Figure 4), all of which presuppose common ancestry. Such trees differ only on
which species have more recently diverged from which. In this context, separate
ancestry is out of the picture, and with it modus Darwin. The fundamental mode of
reasoning to which Darwin’s discussion of adaptive characters adds a caveat is not
similarity, ergo common ancestry but rather greater similarity, ergo more recent
ancestry. The latter is the basic credo of phylogenetic inference (a comparatively
well-researched inference problem). The adaptive characters passage does not show
Darwin using modus Darwin after all.
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Figure 4. Three competing genealogical hypotheses.
This is not to say that Darwin’s discussion of classification and adaptive char-
acters doesn’t ultimately contribute to his case for common ancestry. Darwin
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takes the branching, tree-like structure of his common ancestry hypothesis to ex-
plain the groups-within-groups nature of existing taxonomic relations (Winsor;
2009), as well as, when combined with natural selection, the otherwise mysteri-
ous usefulness (for classification) of non-adaptive traits, rudimentary organs, and
embryological characters (Richards; 2009). And these explanatory feats, thinks
Darwin, redound to the credit of his theory. Of course this is only a casual sketch
of Darwin’s reasoning—not a philosophical analysis linking that reasoning to well-
defined epistemic norms. Yet so long as it is descriptively accurate, we can see
that modus Darwin is not invoked.
Galapagos. Darwin’s Origin discussion of the Galapagos Archipelago is the sec-
ond spot where Sober explicitly maps modus Darwin onto a specific passage. Dar-
win’s brief discussion of the Galapagos comes at the end of two chapters devoted
to the geographical distribution of species, where it serves as an illustration of the
following generalization: “The most striking and important fact for us in regard to
the inhabitants of islands, is their affinity to those of the nearest mainland, without
being actually the same species” (Darwin; 1859/2003, 238–9). Darwin takes this
feature of island biogeography to speak in favor of common ancestry, and Sober
reconstructs that reasoning as follows. Each Galapagos species {X1, X2, . . . Xn}
is paired with a species found on mainland South America {Y1, Y2, . . . Yn} on the
basis of close anatomical similarity (Figure 5). For each pair, the anatomical sim-
ilarity of species Xi to its mainland counterpart Yi supports CA over SA, for that
pair, via modus Darwin. On top of that anatomical evidence, the geographical
proximity of Xi and Yi then adds further support for CA over SA for that pair,
now by the geographical distribution variant of modus Darwin (Sober; 2008, 330).8

ﬀrrr rr r
Xi
&%
'$rrrr rr
Yi
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the Galapagos {X1, . . . Xn}
and mainland South American {Y1, . . . Yn} species featured in
Sober’s reading of Darwin’s Galapagos Archipelago illustration.
I have another reading. Darwin’s island biogeography generalization is a special
case of an even more general trend that he introduces at the very beginning of his
first chapter on geographical distribution, namely that the more accessible any two
geographical regions (by migration or dispersal), the more similar the inhabitants
8Sober sees an additional inference in Darwin’s discussion of the Galapagos, concerning whether
the geographical origin of each pair (Xi, Yi) is the same (Sober; 2008, 331–2). But this additional
reasoning is not an instance of modus Darwin, and no longer concerns CA versus SA.
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of those regions (Darwin; 1859/2003, 347–50). That Darwin’s real focus is relative
proximity within groups of species (n > 2) is not obvious from his (rather cursory)
treatment of the Galapagos, but it is clear looking at the few examples that he
discusses in (somewhat) greater detail. His primary illustrations feature South
America’s unique rodents and flightless birds. The agouti, viscacha, coypu and
capybara are each other’s closest taxonomic relations (i.e., they’re more similar
to each other than to anything else in the world) and they all live in nearby
regions of South America. Somewhat similar, but less so (again, as judged by
existing taxonomic classifications) are the beaver and muskrat, which are found
much further afield in North America and Europe; hares and rabbits are even
more widely dispersed. The flightless birds (greater rhea, Darwin’s rhea, emu, and
ostrich) illustrate the same pattern (Darwin; 1859/2003, 349).
Darwin’s argument goes roughly as follows. Suppose a group of species shares
a branching, tree-like ancestry, and suppose the true tree is reflected (albeit im-
perfectly) in taxonomists’ classifications. How might this be checked against geo-
graphical distribution observations? Consider any species, together with its closest
taxonomic relations plus a somewhat more distally classified species or two (similar
to what we now call an outgroup). Since more recent common ancestry leaves less
time for geographical dispersal, the closest taxonomic relations should typically
be found somewhere more accessible than the outgroup species.9 The observed
trend with which Darwin opens his geographical distribution discussion (the more
accessible the regions, the more similar the inhabitants) shows that this is gen-
erally the case. This relationship is difficult to explain on the supposition that
each species was created independently, so the observations support the common
ancestry suppositions from which we began.
As before with the adaptive characters passage, my alternative reading falls short
of a deep epistemological analysis or evaluation of the argument. The point is that
Darwin’s geographical distribution argument does not conform to modus Darwin.
The step in Darwin’s reasoning that links accessibility to ancestry presupposes CA
for every species pair. And while modus Darwin attends to the absolute proximity
between two species, e.g., “If X and Y are more spatially proximate than [three
units away], then CA has the higher likelihood; if not, not” (Sober; 2008, 326),
Darwin is talking about relative proximity (X is closer to Y than to Z), with no
regard for scale. Indeed, on an absolute scale the Galapagos are very inaccessible
from South America, being separated by 600 miles of open ocean. Darwin’s point is
that even in such cases, the general pattern of relative similarity mirroring relative
proximity persists: for a given Galapagos species, the most similar species found
outside the Galapagos archipelago inhabit the most accessible region, the South
American mainland; less similar species are found further afield.10
9Compare Sober’s (2008, 327–9) discussion of Darwin’s “space-time principle.”
10One special threshold of accessibility does play a role in Darwin’s reasoning: if it were impossible
for a species or their ancestors to get from point A to point B, then species in those locations
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So neither the adaptive characters passage nor the Galapagos example illustrate
modus Darwin in action. While two false alarms don’t show that Darwin never
used modus Darwin, I hope that by supplying alternative readings of the passages
that Sober discusses explicitly, I have at least shifted the burden of proof. My
own judgement—which goes beyond what I can argue for here—is that (at least
in the Origin) modus Darwin plays at best a minor role in Darwin’s reasoning.11
Other passages that may appear to espouse similarity, ergo common ancestry are
in my view most likely abbreviated rehearsals of Darwin’s blanket reinterpretation
of biological classifications as genealogical hypotheses. They are, in other words,
further instances of greater similarity, ergo more recent ancestry. I suggest it is this
phylogenetic thinking—and not modus Darwin—that occurs again and again in
Darwin’s reasoning, as a recurring element within various arguments that Darwin
constructs in support of his theory.
But it may not be quite correct to say that Darwin himself made inferences of the
form greater similarity, ergo more recent ancestry. Nineteenth century taxonomic
classifications were produced by specialists with years of experience working on
specific groups of organisms. Except where Darwin did this kind of work himself
(e.g., on barnacles), he would have relied on the work of others, those classifications
becoming part and parcel of any judgments of similarity between species. Other
naturalists with deeper knowledge of the taxa in question would have proceeded,
in the course of constructing their classifications, roughly along the lines of greater
overall similarity, ergo closer taxonomic relatedness, to which Darwin added “by
‘closer taxonomic relatedness’ I think you mean more recent common ancestry.”
In any case, the beginning-to-end chain of observation and reasoning that goes
from in-depth knowledge of comparative anatomy to a particular genealogical tree
for a given set of taxa is something to which Darwin contributes, and on which
many of his arguments rely.
Modus Darwin versus phylogenetic inference
Given Darwin’s reliance on something like the inference form greater similarity,
ergo more recent ancestry, one might wonder whether this mode of reasoning
founders on the same objections raised above to Sober’s defense of modus Dar-
win. I should therefore briefly explain why those particular objections do not
apply.12 Sober’s likelihood-based defense of modus Darwin proceeds by applying a
could not share common ancestry. Darwin is therefore keen to emphasize the mechanisms and
“accidental means” by which prima facie implausible journeys might have happened.
11A good candidate may be Darwin’s closing comments on common ancestry (Darwin; 1859/2003,
484) where he suggests, on the grounds that all species share some basic chemical and cellular
similarities, that there is just one original species from which everything evolved. But he concedes
this a flimsy argument, and doesn’t take it very seriously.
12More generally, phylogenetic inference is the subject of a massive and ever-expanding scientific
literature that I cannot hope to review here. See Baum and Smith (2013) for a non-technical
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probabilistic model of character state evolution along the branches of the Figure 1
genealogies to arrive at likelihoods p(obs.|CA) and p(obs.|SA), which can then be
compared. Consider the analogous approach to greater similarity, ergo more recent
ancestry.
Here the competing hypotheses are different genealogical trees (Figure 4). And
the observation to which a tree assigns a probability is not a single character state
comparison between species X and Y , but rather a set of such comparisons, one
for each pairing of species within the group under consideration. In the case of
three species, there are three comparisons to make. It is convenient to arrange the
numbers on a 2×2 table, where each cell shows the difference between the character
states of the species associated with that row and column (Figure 6). Applying
Sober’s model of character state evolution along the branches of any Figure 4 tree
yields a stochastic model that assigns a probability to such data. This generates a
likelihood p(obs.|treei) for each of trees 1–3. These likelihoods can be compared,
and the tree that posits most recent ancestry for the most similar species pair
indeed has the highest likelihood (Figure 7). (Sober’s mathematical modeling of
CA and SA borrows from methods of phylogenetic inference, so shifting from CA
and SA to competing genealogical trees is just to return to the original context.
The result is a simplified version of how likelihoods of trees are calculated within
contemporary maximum-likelihood and Bayesian phylogenetic inference.)
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Figure 6. (A) Example data for calculating likelihoods of phylo-
genetic trees, and (B) trait values that would generate those data.
My first objection to Sober’s defense of modus Darwin was that the likelihood
ratio p(obs.|CA)/p(obs.|SA) is inappropriately sensitive to how one models the
space of character traits. Recall that the culprit is the quantity p(obs.|SA); a
bigger space allows for more divergent starting states, making observations of
large character state differences more probable. In contrast, p(obs.|CA) does not
depend on the size of the character space—provided it is not so small that the
species have already bumped into the endpoints—so there is no need to specify its
size beyond “bigger than what evolution has so far explored.” When it comes to
comparing tree versus tree (as per greater similarity, ergo more recent ancestry),
overview, Sober (1991) for a philosophically-oriented introduction, and Felsenstein (1988) for an
early review of mathematical methods.
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every hypothesis in the mix affirms common ancestry, and like p(obs.|CA) the
likelihoods p(obs.|treei) can be calculated without having to postulate a concrete
range of possible character states. (The calculations below employ an infinite
one-dimensional anatomical space.) So the “anatomical space” objection does not
apply to a likelihood-based defense of greater similarity, ergo more recent common
ancestry.
My second objection was that Sober’s likelihood reasoning requires knowledge of
branch length that was unavailable in Darwin’s time. While branch lengths are a
source of uncertainty in phylogenetic inference as well, there is an important sense
in which that uncertainty is less debilitating than in the case of modus Darwin.
In the likelihood contest between CA and SA, simply stretching or shrinking all
branches proportionally can change the direction of evidential favoring from one
hypothesis to the other: an observation that appears to favor common ancestry
instead favors separate ancestry if you double the time scale. The same is not true
when comparing one tree to another, as some example calculations will illustrate.
Using the Figure 6 numbers as an example, Figure 7 displays the likelihoods
p(obs.|treei) for trees 1–3 (refer to Figure 4) over a very wide sweep of branch length
assumptions.13 The important feature of Figure 7 is that the lines never cross,
meaning that the ranking of hypotheses by likelihood is independent of branch
length. This independence is a general feature of the inference problem, not specific
to these example observations. Even very severe uncertainty about the overall
timescale of evolution therefore does not undermine claims about the observations
favoring one tree over another. (Though in the limit, the three likelihoods converge
to the same value, meaning that evidence for one tree over another gradually
weakens. See Sober and Steel (2014) for an in-depth look at this phenomenon.)
Conclusion
What is absolutely clear is that Darwin is eager to convince his readers of common
ancestry, and that some of the Origin passages where he argues most pointedly
for this conclusion involve talk of “similarity” or “resemblance.” But the structure
of the arguments can be somewhat opaque. Sober sees similarity, ergo common
ancestry at work in those arguments, and launches an (informed and enlightening)
investigation into the epistemology of the inference form and its relation to modern
statistical inferences within evolutionary biology (Sober; 1999, 2008, 2011; Sober
and Steel; 2002, 2014).
My aim here has been to review and assess the argument form modus Darwin
and its role in Darwin’s case for common ancestry in the Origin. I have argued
13The quantity varied is the number of time steps from the root of the tree to any leaf (assumed
equal along all three paths); the branching takes place after half this number of steps. (Selectively
stretching only certain sections of a tree, on the other hand, can upend the likelihood ranking—a
genuine issue in phylogenetic inference, as rates of evolution can vary over time and between
lineages.)
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Figure 7. Likelihoods p(obs.|treei) for Figure 6a observations, over
a range of branch lengths. (Equation 2 transition probabilities used
throughout; scaling the transition probabilities with a fixed number
of timesteps yields equivalent results.)
that the probabilistic justification Sober offers for modus Darwin is inadequate.
The basic form of that justification is of course sound (it is the foundation of both
likelihoodist and Bayesian statistics): compare the probability of an observation
supposing common ancestry were true with the same observation’s probability
supposing separate ancestry were true. But this is easier said than done. Sober
picks an observation type and offers a recipe for calculating the two probabilities,
but the recipe calls for some far-fetched ingredients. One of those is branch length,
a perfectly legitimate scientific quantity that is routinely estimated with some
confidence in modern molecular phylogenetics but not by Victorian naturalists.
Another is the range of possible character states, a dubious notion that has no
significance within evolutionary theory.
Sober’s mathematical construction provides a framework for investigating and
rigorously evaluating modus Darwin. I have continued to use that framework here
and it has enabled the present analysis. But for the reasons just rehearsed, that
construction does not yield a satisfactory justification for modus Darwin, especially
not in the nineteenth century context.
In any case, it is far from clear that Darwin argued in that way. Closer inspection
of the passages that motivate the attribution to Darwin reveal a different argument
form, one familiar from contemporary phylogenetics: greater similarity, ergo more
recent ancestry. This argument form is more defensible, both epistemically and
exegetically, though it cannot replace modus Darwin as a self-contained argument
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for common ancestry—indeed it presupposes that conclusion. Greater similarity,
ergo more recent ancestry describes just one step of reasoning, used by Darwin in
constructing more complex arguments.
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